In order to introduce the topic of migration, figures that would give an overview of the phenomenon are required. However, one must bear in mind that migration affects not only the individual on the move, but also his household and his community (Mercier, 2014). The common definition used by the main migration databases (OECD, United Nations, IOM) states that a migrant is an individual who lives in a country where he or she was not born. According to the United Nations, the stock of international migrants accounts for 3% of the world’s population, that is, about 220 to 230 million people, a figure that has multiplied by three over the last fifty years.

With the growing intensity of civil conflicts and instability in the Mediterranean area, this phenomenon is not only important in size, but also in its rapid growth, thus confirming the need to analyse it. Philippe Fargues (2014) points out some of the biases of international statistics of migration and their implications for the research on migration in Arab countries. For instance, significant discrepancies appear when comparing statistics on immigration (such as Dumont and Lemaitre [2004] and Docquier and Marfouk [2006]) with those on emigration. These differences can be as high as 246% in the case of Egypt (Fargues, 2007). As Francesca Marchetta (2012) points out, the reasons behind these discrepancies are two-fold. On the one hand, they may be due to the way the data was constructed for each country, either using origin country or destination country sources (Isaoglu, 2007). On the other hand, a significant share of migration flows is directed towards Gulf countries, where immigration statistics are fairly limited. Despite recent data collection initiatives such as those led by the Economic Research Forum (ERF), data on migration in and from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) remains scarce.

Philippe Fargues (2007) estimated that the stock of migrants from South and East Mediterranean countries\(^1\) amounted to 12.5 million individuals (representing around 4.6% of the total population), of which almost 65% lived in the European Union and slightly over 21% lived in a MENA country. If we only focus on Maghreb and

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\(^1\) The countries considered under this category are the following: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey.
Mashreq ̊ countries as in Table 1, we notice the significant different patterns of migration concerning the destinations between the two sub-regions. While 60% of migration from Mashreq countries is directed towards the Gulf and Libya and only 16% towards Europe, migration flows from Maghreb countries are mainly directed towards European countries.

Table 1 - Migrants originating from Arab Mediterranean countries by region of residence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of origin</th>
<th>Region of destination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>199,153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>25,745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>153,196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>8,401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>109,913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashreq</td>
<td>496,408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>1,475,662</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>43,646</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>26,518</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>2,390,174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>516,440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maghreb</td>
<td>4,452,440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4,948,848</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: These data come from national population censuses of countries of destination and migrants are defined as “foreign-born” or “non-nationals”, Palestinians are a special case, with refugees being counted as migrants. It does not include the number of people in the “diapors”, an ill-defined population impossible to enumerate.

In terms of emigration rates, Lebanon ranks first by far, with a stock of emigrants reaching 11.4% of its population. Among the countries that are studied in this chapter, Morocco ranks second with an emigration rate of 7.8%. We notice that this

2 - Maghreb and Mashreq are two geographical terms, dating from the early Islamic expansion, which designate the eastern and western sub-regions of the Arab world. Maghreb is the term used to designate most of the region in the western North Africa, west of Egypt, with a culture having strong Berber influences. The countries, which were traditionally considered as part of the Maghreb region, were Algeria, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia. With the creation of the Arab Maghreb Union in 1989, Mauritania was also included in the Maghreb countries (as well as the disputed territory of Western Sahara). The Mashreq countries are located in the eastern North Africa, between the Mediterranean Sea and Iran and this category covers Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine and Syria. The cultural and geographical differences between Maghreb and Mashreq countries entail significant differences in migration patterns.
It is worth noting that, in the wake of the Arab Spring (2011) and the ongoing civil wars in Libya (in 2011 and since 2014), Syria (since 2011) and Yemen (since 2015), significant waves of migration occurred within the region rendering existing statistics obsolete. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (2015), not only the Mediterranean countries host the largest number of refugees and displaced population in the world, but most of them are also displaced within the region. It was recorded that in March 2015, the crisis in the Syrian Arab Republic had resulted in almost 4 million registered refugees or persons awaiting registration mainly hosted in Lebanon (1,186,125), Turkey (1,718,147), Jordan (626,357) and Iraq (244,731) and only 214,724 being recorded in European countries. Furthermore, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Action (OCHA) estimated that around 7.6 million were internally displaced people in the region. It was estimated that more than 1,011,000 refugees and migrants had crossed the Mediterranean to Europe in 2015 (Crawley et al., 2016). A recent publication of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) (2015) highlights that while Europe remains the major destination for mixed migration flows (humanitarian and economic migration) from North Africa, due to cultural and historical links, existing networks and employment opportunities, the increasing restrictive immigration regimes contributed to a significant increase in irregular migration. The route that has experienced the fastest and largest growing flow is the Central Mediterranean one which has recorded 170,000 arrivals in Italy in 2014, mainly departing from Libya (90%). However, the migrants recorded in these flows are not only from Mediterranean countries: most of them are Syrians and Eritreans, followed by Malians, Palestinians, Somalis and Egyptians. Despite the expectations of a surge in emigration from Tunisia and Egypt during and post-Arab Spring and a complete shift in patterns, Philippe Fargues and Christine Fandrich (2012) as well as Hein de Haas and Nando Sigona (2012) show that the “large-scale” migration to Europe was no more than a myth. Nevertheless, it is important to note the recent steep increase of Tunisians in Italy, with 4,500 arrivals in 2017, a fourfold increase compared to the previous year. According to Stefano M. Torelli (2017), this recent spike can be explained by the currency depreciation which induced an unprecedented rise in consumer prices, the persisting high unemployment rate and the recent negative shock on the fishing industry (the invasion on an aggressive species) which resulted in many fishermen selling their boats to smugglers’ networks.

The OIM (2015) observes that the Western Mediterranean route continues to be used by the refugees and economic migrants crossing from Algeria and Morocco to Spain, although the flows are relatively small (around 4,755 migrants were detected on this route in 2014) and the proportion of refugees in these flows is significantly smaller than in the Central Mediterranean corridor. Finally, the Eastern Mediterranean route, which was historically the least important one, gained importance with more than 44,000 irregular arrivals mainly in Greece and Bulgaria from Turkey and more than half of them being Syrian nationals.
A brief history of migration

As Ferruccio Pastore (2002) points out, migrations have been a factor of continuity in the history of the Mediterranean and not only in the South-North direction, as for instance the mass migration of Jews from Spain to the Ottoman Empire in 1492 and the emigration of almost 500,000 Italians to Africa between 1987 and 1976. It is only in the last century that the flows reversed, starting with a massive movement initiated by colonial France during World War I by bringing almost 400,000 inhabitants of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia to participate in the war and work in the industries and countryside. The movements intensified with the development of bilateral agreements in the 1950s and 1960s between European labour importing countries and labour exporting countries on both sides of the Mediterranean (Greece, Italy, Morocco, Portugal, Spain, Tunisia, Turkey and Yugoslavia). With the first oil crisis in the early 1970s, Europe started closing its borders, international mobility continued mainly under family reunification regimes and migration started to be increasingly seen as a problem (Pastore, 2002). The global Mediterranean policy (1972-1992) and the renovated Mediterranean policy were the consecutive strategies aiming for a deeper integration of the European countries and their neighbours across the Mediterranean and they culminated with the Barcelona Process, also known as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership established in 1995. The agreement was based on three pillars: economic, political and socio-cultural. Migration was included in the third pillar in order to avoid choosing whether it was a security or economic issue (Pastore, 2002). However, the Barcelona Process came to a substantial stalemate and bilateral migration agreements, which had started as early as 1992 such as the Spanish-Moroccan treaty, started multiplying, but focused on migrant readmission dimensions. With the Barcelona process having broadly been considered a failure, under a French initiative, the partner States tried to revive the process in 2007 and launched the Union for the Mediterranean. It is worth noting that this initiative encountered a strong opposition from European countries such as Germany and Slovenia and from the European Commission, mostly based on the arguments of duplication of institutions and policies and thus a decline in the effectiveness of existing EU policies. The Union for the Mediterranean was thus launched as a new phase of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in 2008, but as talks advanced on the design of its priorities, migration was scaled down. Therefore, in terms of migration management, the approach turned out to be incoherent, mainly due to the fact that it resulted from poorly focused and sometimes contradictory initiatives (Collyer, 2016). The difficulty to reach a political consensus over the years led to a lack of legal routes which resulted in the development of smuggler networks and thus high cost in both economic terms and in terms of human lives.

Description of migration flows

The impact of migration depends on the migrant’s profile, which is particular not only to the timing of migration, but also to each origin-destination country. Furthermore, as Heaven Crawley et al. (2016) stress, it is important to go beyond the misleading representation of migrant movements as linear and beyond the sole focus on the points of departure and arrival. Especially in the Mediterranean countries,
migrants’ journeys are a sum of multiple separate movements, which converge mostly in Libya and Turkey, explaining their arrival in Italy and Greece (Crawley et al., 2016). With Europe’s Mediterranean border having been qualified as the world’s deadliest border (Brian and Laczko, 2014), it is important to understand the dynamics and the channels of Mediterranean migration flows.

First of all, an important transition that occurred in the last decades is that North African countries as well as Turkey, are no longer origin countries. They have also become transit countries for Sub-Saharan, Middle Eastern and Asian migrants. The Western Mediterranean route (from Tangiers in Morocco to Algeciras in Spain) was one of the first routes because it is the shortest. This resulted in the Morocco-Spain migration corridor being the third most important one among the Mediterranean countries (around 700,000 foreign-born individuals). It is topped by the Algeria-France one (almost 1.4 million foreign-born individuals), followed by Morocco-France (around 800,000 foreign-born individuals) (UNDESA, 2015). With the adoption of harsh criminalising laws of undocumented migrants and facilitators in Spain in 2003, alternative riskier routes were used, mainly linking Mauritania, Senegal and the Canary Islands. The flows continued at low levels until mid-2014 when an upsurge occurred and continued until 2017 (Fargues, 2017).

Libya replaced Tunisia as the main departure point for the Central Mediterranean route (ending in Italy) and between 2011 and 2016 around 630,000 used this channel (European Commission, 2017). However, most of the 180,000 migrants arrived in Italy 2016 were from Western and Eastern Africa and 15% were mainly unaccompanied children.

Among North-African Mediterranean countries, Libya hosted the largest number of international migrants, reaching 790,000 in 2017, with the largest majority being of Palestinian origin (37%), followed by Somalis (14%) and Iraqis (9%).

Interestingly, both Morocco and Tunisia witnessed a significant increase over the last few years in the number of immigrants, signalling the passage from origin countries to destination and transit ones (Table 2).

### Table 2 - International migrant stock in Morocco and Tunisia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Morocco</th>
<th>Tunisia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>57,597</td>
<td>38,018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>50,771</td>
<td>36,526</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>95,835</td>
<td>57,663</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Within the sub region, Egypt witnessed a high increase in the immigration stocks, going from 295,000 in 2010 to 491,000 in 2015, mainly originating from Palestine, Syria, Somalia and Sudan. While the oil-rich countries had traditionally been the
primary destination for Egyptian emigrants, emigration flows to Europe had increased since the 2000s, mainly to Italy, where the flows had peaked in 2010 (De Bel-Air, 2016a).

Nevertheless, it is important to highlight that the Mediterranean countries of Southern Europe are the points of departure of the Central Mediterranean route. Between 1991 and 2001 it was estimated that between 150,000 and 250,000 third-country nationals, mostly Albanians, travelled via one of the channels of this route, the channel of Otranto to reach Italy (Fargues, 2017). Interestingly, according to Ferruccio Pastore et al. (2006) the flows through this particular channel almost disappeared in 2002 when the criminal organisations that were controlling the route were dismantled.

Furthermore, as previously mentioned, the Eastern Mediterranean route is the one that gained significant importance lately, with the arrivals through Greece between 2014 and 2016 representing 66% of the sea arrivals recorded in the whole Mediterranean Europe during that period (Fargues, 2017). However, since the early 2000s, undocumented migration to Greece had increased as a consequence of the diversion of migrant flows from Africa resulting from tighter border controls in Spain and Italy and of a significant increase in migration flows from Asia and Middle East. The flows almost stopped in 2016 with the agreement between the EU and Turkey aimed to stop undocumented migrants from crossing to Greece in exchange for financial compensations and a lighter visa regime for Turkish nationals. As Philippe Fargues (2017) points out, the agreement was largely seen as Europe renouncing its “founding ethics of protection”.

The context of migration

While migrations in the Mediterranean were mostly linked to employment opportunities before 2011, the situation changed in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings. According to the Italian Ministry of the Interior, most migrants that have arrived to Italy by sea in the last fifteen years are not citizens of Mediterranean countries3 (Fargues and Bonfatini, 2014). Most of them were originally from Eritrea, Nigeria, Somalia, Iraq, Mali, Pakistan and Afghanistan. However, it is difficult to determine whether the motives of migration are humanitarian or economic. Most of the times it is a mixture of both.

In the framework of a specific project aimed at understanding the dynamics and drivers of Mediterranean migration, Heaven Crawley et al. (2016) interviewed 500 refugees and migrants travelling through the Central (Libya to Italy and Malta) and Eastern (Turkey to Greece) Mediterranean routes and over a 100 stakeholders (smugglers, facilitators, NGOs, State actors). The responses collected reveal that not all of those migrants arriving in Europe are in an irregular situation and that the main reason for the migration or subsequent moves was the conflict in the countries

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3 - It was recorded that between 1 January 1999 and 31 August 2014, 494,555 migrants were smuggled to Italian shores, of which 232,787 were citizens of a Mediterranean country (of which Tunisia, Syria, Former Yugoslavia, Morocco, Palestine, Egypt and Albania are the most represented) and 261,768 were not citizens of any Mediterranean country (Fargues and Bonfatini, 2014).
neighbouring Europe. More than three quarters of the sample mentioned that they migrated due to conflict, persecution, violence, death threats and human rights abuse, with a considerably higher share for those having travelled on the Eastern Route (mainly Syrians). A common characteristic of the migrants is the lack of linearity in their trajectories towards Europe, with a total of 57 different countries through which the migrants have passed and an average of six stops per person between the origin country and the location in 2015.

The implications of international migration for rural populations

Besides conflict, one of the main pushing factors of migration in the Mediterranean is demographic pressure. As climate change, water stress and land scarcity worsened the living conditions in rural areas, demographic pressure increased and resulted in important urbanisation rates. As shown by various authors such as Hein de Haas (2009), internal migration is a first step towards international migration.

A recent report of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) (Deotti and Estruch, 2016) outlines the theoretical channels through which rural out-migration can impact rural livelihoods. However, most channels have ambiguous outcomes and these are related to the composition of the migrant population. For example, labour productivity may increase with migration since there is less pressure on the labour market and thus a potentially more efficient allocation of labour. It could also be synonym with a brain drain phenomenon whereupon the most productive individuals of a community disappear, since they are likely to experience the largest gains from migration. The same reasoning can be applied to skills transfers, income inequality or land degradation where both a net positive and a net negative effect may occur.

In the case of Mediterranean countries, while data on international migration has been significantly improving over the last years, data on internal migration and data allowing an in-depth analysis of the rural dimension of migration is still lacking. The few elements that we can grasp on this issue come from contextualised studies on some countries based on specific surveys. For instance, Jackline Wahba (2015) points out that in Egypt, compared to urban migrants, most rural migrants choose to emigrate because they cannot find a job and they rely more on migration brokers, while also using more intensely their social networks in the destination country. Also, migration had been shown to decrease wage labour in rural areas, as well as urban ones (Binzel and Assaad 2011). In the case of Lebanon, we know that rural villagers in the North who used to emigrate to Australia in the 1970s were low educated and poor and had a very difficult sociocultural insertion (De Bel-Air, 2017). A somewhat similar trend was observed for Turkey where the first migrants to Europe in the early 1960s were mainly low educated individuals from rural areas (De Bel-Air, 2016b). The opposite is true in the case of Jordan, where migration is predominantly an urban phenomenon (Wahba, 2014). In Tunisia, Anda David and Mohamed Ali Marouani (2017) show that the Arab Spring introduced a change in the profiles of emigrants and in the post-revolution emigration flows, the share of emigrants from
a rural area more than doubled. With a stock of emigrants representing about 10% of its population, a decrease of almost 50% of the rural population over the last 50 years and as the third largest remittance recipient in the MENA region (after Lebanon and Egypt), Morocco’s economy and society are strongly impacted by international and internal migration. Hein de Haas (2007a) notes that the intensification of migration flows, internal as well as international, is the result of colonisation and incorporation of rural areas, along with a certain level of socio-economic development. However, he argues that internal and not international migration is one of the factors to have contributed to the agricultural decline in Morocco due to a decrease in both poverty and availability of family labour (Haas, 2007b).

The fact that migration provides diversification of revenue streams is a promising outcome, since land constraint in these countries implies that a focus on the rural nonfarm sector might be a better strategy to fight rural poverty (Janvry and Sadoulet 1993). Richard H. Adams Jr (2001) has confirmed the importance of such activities in the reduction of rural income inequalities in Egypt and Jordan. Just as migration is inseparable from social and economic transformations, opportunities for migration will play important roles in adaptation to climate change. Given the constraints on agriculture, it seems rational for countries to encourage rural income diversification. Migration can be an accompanying factor in this movement. As argued by Jørgen Carling and Cathrine Taaleras (2016), poverty eradication policy has had little success in decreasing either rural-urban migration or international migration, mainly because targeted policies are minor when compared to socio-economic factors, but also because poverty reduction can fuel migration aspirations, as we have seen in the case of some Mediterranean countries. Most of these policies see agriculture as a means to reduce migration aspirations and irregular migration. Existing projects such as “Return to Agriculture” (“Retour Vers l’Agriculture”) in Senegal have already been widely criticised (Pian, 2010; Reid-Henry 2013; Talleraas 2014) and showed limited results (Panizzon, 2008; Diedhiou, 2014). In this specific case, the resources available in the project were insufficient to finance agricultural diversification or the highly needed industrial transformation, but also the huge challenges relative to persistent drought and flooding that the Senegalese agricultural sectors confronts made it unattractive to the target population of youth and unemployed (Carling and Talleraas, 2016).

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