GENDER AND CLIMATE-INDUCED MIGRATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN: from resilience to peace and human security

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Human mobility has featured in global outcome declarations on climate change since 2010. The Cancun Adaptation Framework under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) called on all countries to take “measures to enhance understanding, coordination and cooperation with regards to climate change induced displacement, migration and planned relocation, where appropriate, at national, regional and international levels”. The need for greater understanding of “how impacts of climate change are affecting patterns of migration, displacement and human mobility” had been also highlighted in the Doha COP18 in 2012. “A forum for sharing experiences and enhancing capacities to plan and implement climate adaptation measures that avoid displacement, facilitate voluntary migration, and encourage participatory and dignified planned relocation” had been proposed by the Advisory Group on Climate Change and Human Mobility to Paris COP21 in 2015, committed instead to the establishment of a task force “to develop recommendations for integrated approaches to avert, minimise and address displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change”. The task force is charged with identifying legal, policy and institutional challenges, good practices and lessons learned in developing its recommendations on climate-induced migration including cross-border movements to the Katowice COP24 (2018).

In fact, the fifth assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) provided momentum to the increasing interest of the scientific communities in climate change and human mobility interlinkages. While arguing that “there is low confidence in quantitative projections of changes in mobility, due to its complex, multi-causal nature”, the Report recognised that “displacement risk increases when populations that lack the resources for planned migration experience higher exposure to extreme weather events, such as floods and droughts. Expanding opportunities for mobility can reduce vulnerability for such populations. Changes in migration patterns can be responses to both extreme weather events and longer-term climate variability and change, and migration can also be an effective adaptation strategy”.

The same report acknowledged that “multiple lines of evidence relate climate variability to some forms of conflict” and pointed out that “climate change can indirectly increase risks of violent conflict by amplifying well-documented drivers of these conflicts, such as poverty and economic shocks” (IPCC, 2014).

Several international processes, particularly those providing a special focus on migration and displacement, climate change and disaster risk reduction, increasingly refer to the links between climate change and human mobility. However, these links are not always grounded in evidence and this increased attention has not led to coordinated, significant policy or legislative change and to a comprehensive approach under the Sustainable Development Agenda. In addition, attributing directly human mobility to climate change is extremely difficult since people move for a wide variety of reasons. Tracking mobility from slow onset climate related hazards such as drought or desertification and at the difference of sudden onset climate related hazards, these links need to be better understood for an informed discourse across humanitarian, peace and sustainable development agendas. (UNDP and ODI, 2017). Progress made under the Nansen Initiative since 2012 in the run-up to the negotiations of the post 2015 sustainable development agenda has already prepared the ground for the adoption of the New York Declaration outcome of the United Nations Summit for Refugees and Migrants of 2016.

In 2015, Europe faced unprecedented flows of migrants from the Middle East, the Maghreb, the Sub-Saharan region and the greater Horn of Africa. While securitised border responses were quickly cobbled together, less attention has been paid to the underlying drivers of these migratory flows, among them climate change and its complex secondary effects in countries of origin (IEMed, 2017). Needless to say that Europe is a major destination for mixed migration flows through and from North Africa, due mainly to its proximity, historic and linguistic links, real and perceived economic and employment opportunities, existing networks, and established asylum systems. Increasingly restrictive immigration regimes and border management in Europe, combined with high migration pressures in the region and real labour market demands in Europe, have contributed to the rise in irregular migration (ESCWA-IOM, 2015).

Climate migrants forced to flee because of loss of livelihood or habitat will be unlikely to meet the legal definition of refugees and become irregular migrants. Most migration occurring from climate change is likely to be internal, with the affected population seeking more habitable locations with greater economic opportunities within their own countries. However, a share of these climate migrants will be undoubtedly international. Depending on the specific situation, climate migrants will either resemble labour migrants, seeking better livelihood opportunities in a new location, or refugees and internally displaced persons who have fled situations beyond their individual control (Martin, 2010).

Gender is a system of power relations that permeates every aspect of the migration experience. One cannot understand the opportunities or barriers to migrate, nor the economic upward mobility of some and the downward mobility of others, nor the desire to settle or return, without understanding how migrants are embedded in a
gendered system of relations, with one another and with macro-structures such as global labour markets or states (Nawyn, 2010). To assess the potential impact of climate change on migration, we also need to tackle the gendered dimensions of migration patterns. A migration life is divided into several stages: From pre-migration when actions to mitigate climate change and help individuals to adapt take place, to the displacement perceived as the second stage of the cycle before return or resettlement in another location, and the final stage of the migration life cycle that involves re-integration into the home or a new location. Policies affecting return or settlement in the new location include land use and property rights, social welfare, housing, employment and other frameworks that determine whether individuals, household and communities are able to find decent living conditions and pursue adequate livelihoods (UNDP and ODI, 2017).

Gender is a determining factor of the needs and priorities of climate migrants and will be key for the design of inclusive policies that not only tackle inequality and discrimination but also vulnerability to climate change. Women are disproportionately affected by climate change because they tend to be on average poorer, less educated, have a lower health status and limited direct access to or ownership of natural resources. Both the process (actual movements) and the outcomes (rural-rural or rural-urban migration, out-migration) of climate-induced migration are also likely to be highly gendered (Chindarkar, 2012). Although the link between gender and climate-induced migration is still under investigation, gender remains fundamental in the decision-making process of migration since the assigned roles to men and women in family, community and society are also a defining feature of vulnerability to climate change.

In fact, given their unequal access to resources and information, women and men have different vulnerabilities to climate change. The gendered process plays out differently in diverse societies depending on local cultural norms that entail gender roles, age, class and ethnicity. The masculinisation of migration is a response to the social inequality exacerbated by climate change as strongly related to livelihood, risk exposure and weak adaptive capacity of individuals and groups. The loss of livelihood is indeed the triggering event that sets a migratory plan into motion: men tend to migrate when farming becomes uncertain and once the household income is kept on the decrease (Miletto et al., 2017).

These concerns are reflected in the progress made towards integrating gender into climate negotiations, climate planning and climate action, as demonstrated by the efforts for the adoption and implementation of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Lima Work Programme on Gender (2014, Decision 18/CP.20) and the gender equality considerations in the recent UNFCCC Paris Agreement (2015). Yet, the key challenge remains a systematic integration of gender equality and women empowerment strategies in climate change responses at local, national and international levels. This signifies a paradigm shift that puts gender concerns and the voice and agency of women, girls, men and boys, at the centre of adaptation, mitigation, and disaster risk management efforts (UN WOMEN, 2016).
The research presented in the following sections explores the interaction between gender, migration and climate change, as well as the way forward for a proactive protection of climate migrants in the cases of countries of origin, transit and destination through the Mediterranean routes in addition to the protection of those considered as internally displaced persons within southern and eastern Mediterranean countries after extreme weather events leading usually to conflicts. This chapter will attempt to explore the causal link between migration and climate change through gender lenses. Three main questions drove the research: What are the links between gender, migration and climate change in the context of the Mediterranean region? What are the inclusive policies that we need to identify as responses for internally displaced persons among men, women, boys and girls at national level and the particular protection challenges for cross border movements of climate migrants through the different routes in the Mediterranean? Finally, how will international agendas on gender, climate change, migration and sustainable development proactively protect climate migrants and seek durable solutions to displacement and climate-induced migration in the Mediterranean region?

**Gender and climate-induced migration in the Mediterranean: the double injustice of climate change and gender inequality**

Based on the relatively scarce literature, some authors attempted to conceptualise gender and climate change induced migration and proposed the following framework for analysis (Figure 1).

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**Figure 1 - Gender and climate change: a conceptual framework for analysis**

Source: Chindarkar (2012).
This analytical framework will be used to deeply analyse the gendered dimensions of migration against the backdrop of climate change injustice that has a tremendous impact on human security in the Mediterranean and Europe as has been the case long before in regions as far away as South Asia, the sub-Saharan region and the Horn of Africa. Countries of origin, transit and destination are all concerned by the movement of climate migrants which is intertwined with other problems but no less important than climate change and threatening human security in countries of origin such as conflicts between local communities over natural resources, terrorism risks and armed conflicts in addition to the risks of trans-national crimes (smuggling, human trafficking and slavery) that can occur along the different migration routes. In this section, the analysis of the gendered dimensions of climate-induced migration throughout the migration cycle will be complemented by some insights on gender inequality as one of the determining factors of the movement bringing about climate change induced migration and amplifying the vulnerability to climate change. The objective is to verify whether or not experiences, needs, and priorities of climate migrants and those left behind by their relatives will vary by gender and to explore way forward to account for such differences in order to propose inclusive policies that mitigate the impacts of climate change on women and enhance their resilience to extreme weather events and natural hazards.

**Climate injustice and the different migration patterns in the Mediterranean**

International migration flows from climate change hotspots in sub-Saharan countries, the Horn of Africa and from South Asia to the Mediterranean are attributed to several natural hazards and casualties: desertification, sea levels rise, negative agriculture change and disasters. Migration streams within the borders of Syria, Morocco and Egypt that are also countries of origin of thousands of climate migrants to Europe need to be highlighted. Internally displaced persons because of climate change impacts on ecosystems and livelihoods should be considered on the same footing as international migrants regardless of the regular or irregular nature of the migratory pattern.

**The gendered dimensions of cross border migration to the Mediterranean region**

The Central Mediterranean Route has experienced the largest and fastest growing flows, with more than 1,015,000 arrivals to Europe in 2015 – five times the number recorded in 2014 and the largest number on record with almost 4,000 deaths and missing persons. The number of departures from Tunisia and Libya has risen since the uprisings in 2011, and, from Egypt, since 2013. In 2014, around 90% of arrivals in Europe had been travelling via the Central Mediterranean route and departed from Libya. As reported by some international organisations, a large increase was fuelled by the deteriorating security situation in the country (ESCWA-IOM, 2015). In 2018, among the common nationalities of sea arrivals, Syrians (more than 40%) are still heading the list of refugees travelling through the Eastern Mediterranean Route followed by Iraqi and Afghan who represented respectively (20.4%) and (11.8%) detected in Greece from January 2017 to March 2018.
Nationalities recorded for the same period on the Central Mediterranean Route included Nigerians (15.6%), Guineans (8.3%) and Ivorians (8.2%) followed by other citizens from sub-Saharan countries such as Mali and Senegal. Together, these countries make up more than 50% of arrivals in Italy, most of which arrive via the Central Mediterranean Route. Other migrants from the Sahara are caught up in the flows through the Western Mediterranean Route and are motivated by a mix of humanitarian and economic concerns, especially with the increasing climate vulnerability witnessed in their countries of origin. The number of migrants from North African countries has been on the decrease since 2015; North African migrants represented only 15% of the migration flows to Europe in 2017 (See the map on migration flows towards Europe through the Mediterranean, made by the Emergency Response Coordination Centre, from the Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations [ECHO] of the European Commission [https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/20180327_DailyMap_RefugeeCrisis_CentralMediterraneanRoute.pdf]; see also the maps on Climate change hot spots in sub-Saharan Africa, the Horn of Africa and Asia on the Environmental Migration Portal: www.environmentalmigration.iom.int/maps).

Since January 2017, the top countries of origin of the three migration routes in the Mediterranean include Syria and some sub-Saharan countries such as Nigeria, Guinea and the Ivory Coast. This reflects the prevalence of conflict as a main push factor for migration especially on the Eastern Mediterranean Route. Nevertheless, the increasing number of migrants from sub-Saharan countries through the Central and Western Mediterranean Routes could reveal a shift in these push factors. The majority of migrants from this region are likely to be climate migrants. They are generally irregular migrants and their legal protection by the international law in Europe poses a particular problem. The following graph presents the large number of migrants to Europe from some countries of origin for the period January 2017 to March 2018.

The share of women seems to be more significant on the Eastern Mediterranean Route (22% women and 37% children) than on the Central route (11% women and 15% children), and the Western route (8% women and 9% children); This is due to the nature of displacements from conflict affected countries to Turkey and Europe involving families rather than individuals and the high risks related to sea arrivals of women and children on the Western and Central Mediterranean Routes compared to land arrivals through the Eastern Mediterranean Route. New trends of irregular migrants’ flows to Europe obviously show that migration from some countries of origin in the southern Mediterranean countries is becoming a family project.

Nevertheless, migration is closely linked to masculinity and requires economic and physical capacities that are not available to everyone (UNFPA, 2009); therefore, some scholars argue that women and children and elderly are usually left behind in the face of an environmental crisis. However, a more thorough analysis of the vulnerability of women to climate change is required to understand the gender aspects of the different factors that lead to climate-induced migration and the differential impacts that the process and the outcomes of climate change induced migration have on women, including internal displacements.
Gender and climate-induced migration in the Mediterranean

Graph 1 - Migratory flows toward Europe through the Mediterranean by origin countries


The analysis of the gendered dimensions of migration flows across and within borders reveals the double injustice undergone by women due to the adverse impacts of climate change and to gender inequality. Such analysis will allow the design of inclusive policies as a response to climate change and extreme weather events threatening livelihood, increasing women’s vulnerability and impoverishing local populations and in some cases engendering and/or exacerbating social unrests and protracted conflicts.
Gendered dimensions of climate change induced migration within states borders

Climate change induced migration within borders includes rural-rural and rural-urban flows in addition to Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). We will particularly focus on the case of Syria and the climate change impacts perceived as root causes of the armed conflict and the massive displacement movements within the state borders since 2011. Case studies from Egypt and Morocco will shed lights on the multifaceted challenges of climate induced migration, notably rural-urban and rural-rural displacements and render possible some analysis about their process and outcomes through gender lenses. Furthermore, climate migrants across borders have usually experienced at least one internal displacement before leaving to the Mediterranean. Figures from the sub-Saharan region and the Horn of Africa will be included for a comprehensive overview on the impacts of climate change and climate disasters on human displacement and their gendered dimensions.

Internally displaced persons are the “persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalised violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognised State border” (Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 1998). At a second stage, a number of Internally Displaced Persons in sub-Saharan countries and the Horn of Africa are expected to flee to the Mediterranean operating a fundamental change in their status against international law from IDPs to International Migrants.
In sub-Saharan Africa, changed patterns of rainfall would have particularly serious impacts on food security (Brown and Crawford, 2008). The new patterns and other intense hydrological cycles mean that extreme weather events such as droughts, storms and floods are expected to become increasingly frequent and severe. Serious impacts on agriculture are predicted by the IPCC, which is largely rain-fed in sub-Saharan countries: yields from rain-fed agriculture could fall by up to 50% by 2020. Agricultural production, including access to food, in many African countries and regions is expected to be severely compromised by climate variability and change” (IPCC, 2007).

It is noteworthy to mention that 1,711,190 IDPs are settled in Nigeria but Nigerian populations forcibly displaced to neighbouring countries are registered as follows: 87,630 in Cameroon, 9,933 in Chad, 108,470 in Niger while thousands of Nigerians have been fleeing to the Mediterranean region in recent years. Nigeria is currently the top sending country from Africa and Asia to Europe through the Mediterranean routes. More than 18,000 Nigerians fled their territories and other neighbouring countries to migrate to the Mediterranean region in 2017. Most of them might be climate migrants but we need more evidence to acknowledge this status and to propose a special regime for their protection.

The regional displacement figures from sub-Saharan Africa need to be complemented by the climate change profiles of other regions, notably the Horn of Africa. Migration flows from January 2017 to March 2018 included individuals from Somalia, Eritrea, and Sudan. Apparently, the rapid onset climate change events such as extreme weather events and disasters are the root causes of those migration flows to the Mediterranean as registered for the same period. Indeed, migration towards Europe forms only a small percentage of people on the move. The number of migrants from Eastern African countries (Eritrea, Somalia, Ethiopia in addition to Sudan) amounted to 18,702 during 2017 and largely surpassed those who had fled Nigeria and are not below those who had fled Syria in the same year (IDMC, 2017).

In fact, in 2017, the drought in the Horn of Africa with Somalia facing severe food insecurity due to consecutive seasons of poor rainfall, led to massive displacements of individuals. By late 2017, cereal production in southern Somalia’s major crop production zones was 37% below long-term average, food prices had increased, and malnutrition and the spread of water borne diseases have peaked. As a result, approximately 6.2 million people were in need of emergency food or livelihood support while 3.1 million were in need of urgent humanitarian assistance (DRC, 2017). Internal displacement was also high in the country with the UN reporting that approximately 2.1 million people were internally displaced in 2017 with around 701,500 displaced in the first half of the year. However, drought-related displaced people amounted to 874,000 in November 2017 in Somalia. In addition, 15.2 million in the Horn of Africa were severely food insecure in 2017 and 5.2 million women and children acutely malnourished (see the map on new displacements by conflict and disasters in 2016, in IDMC [2017, pp. 2-3]: www.internal-displacement.org/publications/2017-global-report-on-internal-displacement).
Climate change induced internally displacements in Syria: The displacements in the Syrian Arab Republic provided evidence that climate change has a direct impact on people’s lives and livelihoods. As reported in the Arab Sustainable Development Report (ESCWA-UNEP, 2015) between 2006 and 2011, nearly 60% of the population suffered the worst drought and crop failure in the country’s modern history. Local populations and especially small farmers are increasingly placed before the difficult choice of fight or flight. In 2009, more than 800,000 Syrians had lost their livelihood as a result of drought. In 2010, an estimated 200,000 people migrated from their farms to urban areas.

In the case of Syria, interlinkages between climate change, displacement and conflicts and their impact in terms of human migration should be analysed in depth given the situation in the Mediterranean. It is noteworthy that the climate change research community has developed five scenarios for socio-economic conditions for the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), known as the shared socioeconomic pathways (SSPs), which involve several aspects of human societies, but of particular importance such as changes in global population as well as the economic output per capita. A large body of quantitative studies of conflict show that the incidence of armed conflict depends on many of the same factors as climate change. Key findings of some scholar contributions to climate science entail increasing evidence about the climate change-armed conflicts interface.

Rural-rural displacement in the Saiss Region in Morocco: In Morocco, rural-rural migration is an important strategy for many who are escaping climate variability and unemployment in their hometowns to take advantage of labour opportunities in thriving agricultural activities, elsewhere. Researchers selected three rural sending and receiving communities in the Saiss region (Morocco) based on differences in socio-economic factors, gender norms, and biophysical dynamics in order to capture the close link between labour work and migration and understand the experiences of men and women migrant labourers from their localities as the migration is in progress. Data for this case study was collected through a survey administered to 400 labourers (179 women and 221 men) employed in the intensified agricultural sector of Saiss region.

According to this research, gender differences are important to account for as men and women have different migration strategies and experiences and thus require different interventions. In light of climate-induced migration from a gender perspective, logistic regression models, political ecology approach and gender analysis have been used for the analysis of investments in irrigation. Based on key findings of the study on the need to raise awareness among men about gender equality and the need for women’s participation in decision-making, particularly with regards to assets and property rights and the economic advancement of women, researchers stressed the importance of a sustained focus on women ownership and control over unalienable assets in the resettlement areas.

Rural-urban climate change induced displacements in the Nile Delta: The vulnerability of farmers to climate change in Al-Bahirah is the landmark of the impact of climate change on livelihoods in the Nile Delta. Over 70% of the population in the Al-Bahirah
Governorate in Egypt’s Nile Delta is within the working-age group (aged 15-64). Notwithstanding this favourable percentage, the population faces a number of underdevelopment challenges that curb their productivity, such as an illiteracy rate of 41.1%, and a school non-enrolment rate between 6 and 10%. Considering these factors, the high outward migration rate, at 3.4% in 2014, illustrates a critical concern regarding the quantity, nature and quality of development and productivity opportunities available for people in Al-Bahirah.

The general dissatisfaction of young people, particularly young men, with the nature of agricultural-based opportunities creates a strong push factor for rural-urban migration. Generally, these young men show interest in employment opportunities that are not readily available in their local communities. This dynamic creates a change in gender roles, forcing rural women to take on the additional work burden in the agricultural sector in addition to their reproductive, household and community roles. For instance, 32% of rural women in Al-Bahirah reported such additional burdens associated with securing sufficient water resources. These changes have critical long-term consequences over the viability of returns to agricultural activity and food security, which creates a vicious cycle of vulnerability and under-development.

**Gender inequality, climate vulnerability and migration**

Based on the IPCC definition of vulnerability as a concept used to express the complex interaction of climate change effects and the susceptibility of a system to its impacts, the integrated vulnerability assessment methodology will be needed for this analysis (ESCWA et al., 2016). From this perspective, vulnerability is also understood as a function of a system’s climate exposure, sensitivity and adaptive capacity to cope with climate change effects. The *exposure* refers to changes in climate parameters that might affect socio-ecological systems (temperature and precipitation, etc.), which alters the respective magnitude and intensity as well as spatial and temporal distribution whereas *sensitivity* provides information about the status quo of the physical and natural environment that makes the affected systems particularly susceptible to climate change (a sensitivity factor could be topography, land use/land cover, population distribution and density, built environment, proximity to the coast, etc.). *Potential Impact* is determined by combining the exposure and sensitivity of a system to climate change. Finally, *adaptive capacity* refers to “the ability of a system to adjust to climate change (including climate variability and extremes), to moderate potential damages, to take advantage of opportunities, or to cope with the consequences” (IPCC, 2007). Combining exposure, sensitivity and adaptive capacity allows assessing the vulnerability of a system to climate change.

In fact, women are the custodians of natural resources and major actors for building resilience at local level and coping with socio-economic vulnerabilities brought about by a wide range of natural and man-made hazards that men, women, girls and boys are forced to shoulder the burden unequally. Maintaining the natural resource base of economic and social development will be conducive for sustaining growth and ensure human well-being through a pro-poor local development. Usually, women and girls are depicted as a vulnerable group in the context of climate-induced
migration. The discourse about their adaptive capacity either when they are left behind by their relatives in countries of origin or when they are striving for survival on different migration routes to the Mediterranean needs to be renewed. Women are indeed agents for change in countries of origin. One should particularly focus on their role in climate resilience but their integration in peace building approaches and post conflicts resilience schemes seems to be a prerequisite for climate resilience. Furthermore, the relief and emergency intervention of international actors on the field should not overlook a more constructive developmental approach that replaces women in countries of origin as strategic actors for local development and builds on climate finance opportunities. The current status obviously shows that climate vulnerability in these countries is perpetuating gender inequality and climate-induced migration will undoubtedly exacerbate the vulnerability of women and girls.

*Climate vulnerability is perpetuating gender inequality in countries of origin*

In rural areas, the impacts of climate change on the access to productive and natural resources, amplifies existing gender inequalities. Climate change affects assets and well-being of women and men differently in terms of agricultural production, food security, health, water and energy resources. Women’s dependence on and unequal access to land, water, and other productive assets which are compounded by limited mobility and decision-making power in many contexts mean that they are disproportionately affected by climate-related natural disasters and conflicts and consequently by climate-induced migration.

In fact, climate change will be forcing countries of origin to rethink not only long-standing gender roles that have perpetuated gender inequality but also gender sensitive climate change strategies. In the majority of these countries, women will exclusively face the impact of natural disasters. This is because they are often poorer than men, responsible for natural resources and household management, lack access to opportunities for improving and diversifying their livelihoods, have low participation in decision-making, and bear solely the responsibility as female-headed household in migration situations.

The formulation of gender responsive strategies to climate change, requires not only the determination of the risks and vulnerabilities that pertain to women, men, girls, and boys at all levels but also drawing these strategies to address a wide range of socio-economic, cultural, and structural inequality issues. Gender analysis is an adequate tool to provide a comprehensive overview of the social representation, the role and responsibilities, natural resources rights, adaptive capacities and all forms of resilience that need to be embedded into the national climate change strategic frameworks.

Unequal access to land is the landmark of societies in countries of origin, especially in the South of the Mediterranean and making progress towards equality will require a strong commitment to remove all hindrances that currently prevent women from access to land and non-land assets. Access to land and ownership are essential to women empowerment and gender equality. In countries of origin, gender equal tenure rights need to be promoted in order to ensure equality in land access. It is
important to determine not only who owns the land but also, who the titular head of the household is and who has decision-making power over the land and its uses. In several countries, the masculinisation of the rural space remains a salient feature despite land governance transformation induced by tenure reforms. According to the OECD (2014), “in only 37% of the 160 countries on which data were collected do women and men have equal rights to own, use and control land”. In more than half of them, while the law guarantees women and men the same rights to own, use and control land, customary, traditional and religious practices prevent women from having access to land. In 4% of these countries women explicitly have no legal right to own, use and control land. Graph 3 compares female agricultural holders from a regional perspective. Sub-Saharan Africa exhibits a much more better figure (17%) than Arab countries, especially in the South of the Mediterranean (less than 5%) that remains well below global average.

Graph 3 - Number of female agricultural holders by region

For reforms to be successful on women’s rights to land, legal frameworks need to be specific about ownership and inheritance, movable and immovable property, joint titling, and disposal of marital property. However, rather than ownership, security of tenure is fundamental to women’s economic, social and political empowerment, as well as to an increased prosperity for their families and communities. In fact, security of tenure is a prerequisite for the access to non-land resources, especially to the financial services needed for the promotion of women entrepreneurship in rural areas. Skilled women holders of their agriculture lands are well placed to apply the best available techniques to their exploitations and to enhance the productivity of their lands through innovation and adapted technologies to the local context (UNEP, 2016).

In addition, women and girls typically carry the largest burden of unpaid care and domestic work, which only increases in a changing climate. Women often have primary responsibility for water and fuel provisioning; thus, changes in their availability due to climate-induced drought and scarcity affect the time and level of effort required to collect, secure, distribute and store these vital resources. With the task
of water collection falling mostly on the shoulders of women, available data on the access to drinking water provides several figures on the hardship of women collecting water for domestic uses, especially in rural areas. Water collection is an unpaid work that might prevent women and girls from making progress in education and achieving personal fulfilment through work and leisure. Water related chores keep young girls under fifteen out of schools and the time burden of water collection has tremendous impacts on their lives. Water collection competes with time to spend on other economic activities and the time burden of water collection diminishes the ability of women to engage in other activities such as waged work, political involvement, recreation and cultural activities.

Box 1: Access of women to land and non-land assets in Nigeria and Syria

Case study of Nigeria

Nigerian women have very limited ownership rights. Civil law entitles women to have access to land, and a few states have enshrined equal inheritance rights into law, but certain customary laws stipulate that only men have the right to inherit and own land. Data from the government indicates a significant gender gap in land ownership: only 24% of landowners are women. In the South, women are more likely to own and access land than in the North. The Northeast shows the great disparity between men and women in terms of land ownership: only 4% of women own land compared to 52% of men.

More broadly, under civil and Islamic law, married women have the right to access non-land assets. In addition, for civil marriages, the default marital property regime is that of separation of property. Limited financial resources and lack of collateral restrict women’s access to financial services, including bank loans. In certain cases, financial institutions demand prior consent of the woman’s husband before granting a loan.

The National Poverty Eradication Programme and other micro-credit schemes offer low-interest, business-oriented loans and other micro-credit and vocational training programmes for women. However, statistics show that less than one-third of loans in Nigeria are awarded to women. In addition, while married and unmarried women can open a bank account in the same way as a man, very few have accounts but instead rely on informal or other micro-finance institutions for access to capital (OECD, 2014).

Case study of Syria

In Syria, the default marital property regime is that of separation of property and the original owner has the legal right to administer property during marriage. In addition, there are no legal restrictions on women’s access to land. However, overall, women’s land ownership remains very low; in 2006, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) reported that only 5.3% of agricultural land was owned by women, and that land holdings owned by women were on average smaller than those owned by men. In addition, women who own non-land assets or businesses may hand day-to-day control over to male relatives, as a result of social pressure or because they do not feel confident enough to manage assets themselves. The law does not appear to make any distinction between men and women’s access to financial services, including bank loans and credit. It is reportedly very difficult, however, for women in rural areas to obtain credit, as banks tend to require significant collateral (OECD, 2014).
Women are depicted as a disadvantaged social group in many aspects of social and economic life, which can impact on their capacity to cope with water scarcity. “Policies directly addressing water scarcity need to be rights based and gender responsive. Access to safe water also plays an important part given that women are primary caretakers of family and children and require access to safe water” (ESCWA, 2016). Women are more likely to manage the household and, in effect, control water consumption. Furthermore, women and men are unequally affected by water availability, access and quality due to the prevailing economic roles and social norms. In rural areas men often focus on water for farming and raising livestock whereas women’s concerns are water uses for domestic needs, health and hygiene. The difference of priorities in managing water in rural areas ranges from irrigation systems for men and drinking water provision for women. Consequently, a gendered profile of water collection is more pronounced in rural areas in countries of origin where gender inequalities are perpetrated through formal rules and informal practices.

In fact, women tend to make decisions about resource use and investments in the interest and welfare of their children, families, and communities (UN WOMEN, 2016). As economic and political actors, women can influence policies and institutions towards greater provision of public goods, such as energy, water and sanitation, and social infrastructure, which tend to matter more to women and support climate resilience and disaster preparedness (Beaman et al., 2011; UN Women, 2014). However, gender inequality is exacerbating the vulnerability of women and girls. However, even if supposed to be an adaptation strategy to climate change, climate-induced migration as a major environmental change, will amplify existing vulnerabilities and women will be exposed to heightened risks either on the different routes to the Mediterranean or in countries of origin, transit and destination.

Climate-induced migration is exacerbating vulnerability of women and girls

The loss of livelihood triggers the preparation of a migratory plan. During the pre-migration stage, food starts and continues to lack when women feed their children and husbands first, they then remain with an empty stomach, which leads to dire consequences on their health (Miletto et al., 2017). For the majority of those who are affected, male out-migration is one among many livelihood strategies that are essential to meet subsistence needs. To those who possess land, remittances are crucial in this process as they are diverted into hiring labour to maintain land productivity while men are away. The workload of women increases both due to climate variability and the absence of men (Sugden et al., 2016).

Food and nutrition insecurity as the main push factor of migration flows are deeply intertwined with conflicts in countries of origin. Like its neighbouring countries, Nigeria is at the forefront of the Lake Chad Basin insurgency, provoked by the terrorist acts of Boko Haram and the increased violence between herdsmen and farmers largely related to land use, natural resource exploitation, and disruptions in traditional lifestyles. Climate change is exacerbating this chaotic situation and Nigeria is also facing increasing temperatures leading to encroaching desertification, rising sea levels and coastal degradation and consequently to a vicious cycle of
impoverishment, violence and human movements within and across state borders in the sub-Saharan region.

Therefore, migration seems to be the only avenue to face not only the variability in weather patterns, violent storms and other climate stressors of agricultural and livestock production but also to overcome the food insecurity caused by the proliferation of hostilities, the adversity of conflicts through massive movements of refugees and IDPs. Systematic violations committed against women and girls in conflict areas across this region have intensified in an unprecedented pace and in varying forms, from physical to sexual violence and need to be addressed. Efforts for prevention and the provision of relief, recovery and rehabilitation services to victims need to be deployed.

Also, the greater Horn of Africa has traditionally experienced cross-border migration by pastoralists. Climate change and environmental degradation have contributed to resource-based conflicts between and among pastoralist communities, increased frequency of migration, variation from traditional migration routes and increased distance to move. At the same time, men, women and children making up the migrant flows frequently face unsafe modes of transportation and smuggling networks during their journey, exposing themselves to injury, violence, detention, exploitation and sexual abuse. In Libya, the media has reported slavery as one of these risks.

The exposure of women to the heightened dangers and casualties on the different routes to the Mediterranean is well known but evidence is required through accurate, reliable and disaggregated data for the formulation of gender-responsive policies to enhance the resilience of women and girls to those impacts. On the other hand, conflicts and massive movements of displaced persons and climate refugees within and from Africa, the Middle East and Asia, are affecting men and women differently. The socio-economic vulnerabilities of women are indeed exacerbated by the extreme fragility of local economies and the destruction of the natural resource base, the degradation of land and livestock, brought about by hostilities in countries of origin. Conflict can also lead to the adoption of other coping strategies that damage the local resource base, such as intensified land use, encroachment of protected areas and even deforestation. In turn, this environmental degradation can limit women’s access to essential resources, further marginalising impoverished communities.

In the case of Syria, strategies to cope with the impact of conflicts are more dangerous, affect human dignity and threaten human security. Adopting riskier behaviours such as prostitution, or other tactics to maintain or gain access to livelihood assets are very common in the context of conflict. Besides, child marriage needs to be prevented, especially for Internally Displaced Persons within the refugee camps. Moreover, it is not excluded that women, fleeing their cities and villages of origin may inevitably become perpetrators of violence and full part of the conflict in order to ensure their survival. Human trafficking either along the different migration routes or in countries of transit or destination as well as non-accompanied children travelling to countries of transit or destination have been reported by the international specialised organisations including the International Organisation for Migration (IOM).
Systematically addressing gender gaps in responding to climate change is one of the most effective mechanisms to build the climate resilience of individuals, households, communities and nations. The growing recognition of the disproportionate impact of climate change on women and girls has been matched in recent years by the rising awareness of their roles as change agents and the tremendous value of gender equality and women empowerment for social, economic, and climate resilience benefits. The gender approach for the international protection of climate migrants in the Mediterranean and beyond should be considered as a means to enhance climate resilience and prevent forcibly human movements under an inclusive regional framework translating the objectives of the global agenda on migration into national gender sensitive strategies for rural development in countries of origin.

**Towards a Mediterranean framework for the protection of climate migrants**

The definition of climate migrants is not a semantic issue but it is crucial to recognise a legal status for those fleeing the adverse effects of climate change since they are not considered as refugees under the 1951 Refugee Convention. The multi-causality dimensions of human movements across and within borders and the diversity of migration drivers including environmental factors are an additional argument to impose at least a working definition of the two notions: climate migrants and climate migration. In fact, an advocacy definition is needed to bring visibility to these migrants and to place them on the policy agenda.

A neutral definition is also highly needed to avoid further delay in providing support to those migrating due to climate impacts (IOM, 2014). Protection of climate migrants could be envisaged upstream and downstream the movements through the different Mediterranean routes and should target differently women, girls, men and boys. Rescue interventions in countries of origin, transition and destination are not sufficient to resolve the problem and its root causes such as violence, conflicts, poverty and vulnerability to climate change and disasters. Climate-induced migration will need to be expansively addressed under the 2030 Agenda taking into account a developmental approach to build resilience but also to rethink gender-inclusive climate change strategies.

At national level, mainstreaming gender into climate change policies in the light of the migration countries profiles seems to be the pathway for revisiting rural development policies under climate change negotiations and climate finance rules and regulations. A Protection Agenda is needed to overcome the food crisis in countries of origin of international migration and for IDPs since this crisis is rooted in a context marked by climate insecurity. However, relief actions under a humanitarian approach cannot resolve the problem. A comprehensive approach for protection under a Regional Agenda needs to be adopted.
The Nansen Initiative and the Regional Protection Agenda of climate migrants

The Nansen Initiative was launched by Switzerland and Norway in 2012 to ensure better protection for people who are forced to flee across borders in the context of disasters and other impacts of climate change. The Platform on Disaster Displacement was proposed to ensure the implementation of the Protection Agenda. The objective is to close the legal gap between people affected by disaster displacement including climate-induced migration and IDPs who are protected by the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, on the one hand; and refugees who are covered by the 1951 Refugee Convention, on the other hand. This gap is also institutional since there is currently no international agency or organisation explicitly mandated with protecting and supporting people affected by disaster displacement.

Launched at the World Humanitarian Summit in Istanbul in May 2016, the Platform on Disaster Displacement was created as a follow-up mechanism of the Protection Agenda, which compiles the findings and conclusions of the Nansen Initiative. This platform is intended to close the knowledge gaps regarding cross-border disaster-displacement. Against this backdrop, the protection Agenda was adopted in 2015 by 109 states. It lists measures and effective practices under a tool box approach in the relevant areas including measures touching upon disaster risk reduction, climate change adaptation and humanitarian action.

Participants to the consultative process for the preparation of the protection Agenda pointed out that disaster displacement “exacerbates pre-existing vulnerabilities. Sick and wounded persons, children, particularly when orphaned or unaccompanied, women headed households, people with disabilities, older persons, migrants, and members of indigenous peoples are often among the most seriously affected survivors of disaster”. They acknowledged that due to a lack of opportunities for regular migration, some persons impacted by natural hazards might resort to irregular migration with all its negative consequences, particularly their impacts on women and children. They expressed their concerns about the particular risks of gender-based violence and the heightened risk of trafficking and exploitation. They called for protection during Cross-Border Displacement in the Context of Disasters and Climate Change by respecting human rights of persons displaced across borders, especially the right to personal integrity and the strengthening of effective measures in responding to disasters to protect women, boys and girls, against violence, including gender-based violence. While migration can be highly beneficial, it also carries out the potential risk of human trafficking and smuggling after disasters and migrants might be economically exploited, exposed to dangerous conditions at their place of work or home, face discrimination or become victims of violence. Humanitarian Protection Measures for Cross-Border Disaster Displaced Persons aimed to promote and facilitate the implementation of identified effective practices in terms of protection and assistance could provide useful information for the reform of national laws, policies and strategies to determine to what extent they allow for temporary admission, stay or non-return and the formulation
of lasting solutions for cross-border disaster displaced persons, taking account of the specific needs of women and children and local communities.

According to the Nansen Initiative, guidance on a systematic engagement with women facilitates planned relocation processes and contributes to a successful outcome of those processes. Moreover, disaster displaced persons, and in particular women, children, older persons, and persons with disabilities need protection and assistance during the emergency relief phase, as well as ongoing support during the recovery and reconstruction phases through the provision of adequate infrastructure and social services. Participants of the Nansen Initiative agreed that prevention, preparedness, and responses to cross-border displacement in the context of disasters require action at community, national, regional and international levels, with special attention to the needs of women, youth and children. They have identified many areas where action is needed notably for the prevention and mitigation of the displacement impact through disaster risk reduction measures and resilience building. Special attention was given to cross-border movements of pastoralists. In this case migration is considered as an adaptation strategy to environmental impacts linked to climate change. In order to achieve concrete outcomes in these areas, reference should be made to the 2030 Agenda under an adequate regional framework that might be proposed for the Mediterranean to prevent flows of climate migrants and find alternative ways by mainstreaming the gender approach in countries of origin.

Gendered dimensions of 2030 Agenda and the protection of climate migrants under the New York Declaration of 2016

National disaster risk reduction strategies in line with the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 need to be adopted to strengthen resilience and adaptive capacity to climate-related hazards and natural disasters in all countries (Target 13.1 of the Sustainable Development Goals SDGs of the UNDP). Local disaster risk reduction strategies are also required and should be aligned with the national strategic framework on risk reduction (indicators for target 13.1). Furthermore, target 13.b of the SDGs exhorted countries to “promote mechanisms for effective climate change-related planning and management in least developed countries, taking account of women, youth and local and marginalised communities”.

Internally Displaced Persons have the status of citizens. Displacements within national borders as a response to climate change and disasters have no impact on this status. IDPs are therefore entitled to legal rights and protection and their movement could fall under the “Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement of 1998” (UN Economic and Social Council, 1998), which deliberately does not constitute a binding legal norm and need to be integrated into national constitutional and legal frameworks for its enforcement.

However, in the sub-Saharan region and the Horn of Africa, witnessing the highest risks of climate-induced migration, IDPs are intended to cross borders not only to neighbouring countries but also to other transit countries on their long journey to destination countries in Europe. Some of the climate migrants become refugees due
to the complexity of the intertwined migration drivers including conflicts and political persecution. The international human rights law, the humanitarian law and the refugee law can therefore be applied to them (IDMC, 2017).

It is worthy recalling that the specific protections afforded under the 1951 Refugee Convention of 1951 are limited to refugees fleeing persecution, and as such, the terms of the Convention exclude any of the other myriad of factors, including climate change and environmental degradation, that might plausibly be the key driver for the decision to flee and a determining feature of the journey.

However, outcome of the United Nations Summit for Refugees and Migrants of 2016, reaffirming the status quo, the New York Declaration did include a pledge by states to work towards two Global Compacts, one on migration, the other on refugees. The Declaration recognised the multi-causal drivers of migration, which may include the adverse effects of climate change and other natural hazard related disasters (A/71/L.1) and expressed the commitment for the implementation of the 2030 Agenda “whose objectives include eradicating extreme poverty and inequality”. It revitalised the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development promoting “peaceful societies based on international human rights and the rule of law, creating conditions for balanced, sustainable and inclusive economic growth and employment, combating environmental degradation and ensuring effective responses to natural disasters and the adverse impacts of climate change”. It also underlines commitment to migrants and refugees and “the importance of a comprehensive approach [...] to ensure a people-centred, sensitive, human, dignified, gender responsive and prompt reception for all persons arriving in their countries, and particularly those in large movements, whether refugees or migrants”.

They expressed their commitment to “assist, impartially and on the basis of needs, migrants in countries that are experiencing conflicts or natural disasters, working, as applicable, in coordination with the relevant national authorities and took note in this regard of the Migrants in Countries in the Crisis initiative and the Agenda for the Protection of Cross-Border Displaced Persons in the Context of Disasters and Climate Change resulting from the Nansen Initiative”.

From a gender perspective, they committed to ensure that “the responses to large movements of refugees and migrants mainstream a gender perspective, promote gender equality and the empowerment of all women and girls and fully respect and protect the human rights of women and girls”; to combat sexual and gender-based violence to the greatest extent possible and to provide access to sexual and reproductive healthcare services. The multiple and intersecting forms of discrimination against refugee and migrant women and girls will be tackled and the full, equal and meaningful participation in the development of local solutions and opportunities will be ensured based on the recognition of women leadership. Also, the different needs, vulnerabilities and capacities of women, girls, boys and men will be taken into consideration. Moreover, the need to address the specific situation and vulnerability of migrant women and girls by, inter alia, incorporating a gender perspective in migration policies and strengthening national laws, institutions and programmes to combat gender-based violence, including trafficking in persons and discrimination against women and girls was recognised by the Declaration.
For the reception and admission by the receiving States, measures are to be put in place for the identification of persons in need of international protection such as refugees in order to provide them with adequate, safe and dignified reception conditions, with a particular emphasis on persons with specific needs, victims of human trafficking, child protection, family unity, and prevention of and response to sexual and gender-based violence, and support the crucial contribution of receiving communities and societies in this regard. On a positive note, the Global Compacts could be better aligned to support national adaptation and development plans or vice versa this would enable countries to better take account of the needs of people who want to or need to move, as well as shift the discourse according to which migration is a failure in adapting to climate change.

The Global Migration Working Group has drawn a set of principles and guidelines on the human rights protection of migrants in vulnerable situations, and the Human Rights Council (HRC) and the Office of the Higher Commissioner of Human Rights (OHCHR) have both sought a rights-based approach to climate change. This is of critical importance to national adaptation planning processes, as issues of justice, equity and accountability are fundamental if climate-resilient development goals are to be achieved.

During the formulation phase of the Global Compact for Migration, one of the informal thematic sessions focused on natural hazard-related disasters, including those influenced by climate change, as drivers of migration. The session pointed out the importance of aligning the Global Compact for Migration with the existing international frameworks on climate change, as well as existing guidelines on migration related to environmental factors.

**Protection of climate migrants under the climate change frameworks**

Acknowledging that climate change is a common concern of humankind, parties to the Paris Agreement pledged to respect, promote and consider their respective obligations on human rights, the right to health, the rights of local peoples and communities, migrants, children, persons with disabilities and people in vulnerable situations and the right to development, as well as gender equality, empowerment of women and intergenerational equity, when taking action to address climate change. Adaptation should follow a country-driven, gender-responsive, participatory and fully transparent approach, taking into consideration vulnerable groups. Furthermore, capacity-building for the implementation of this agreement should be guided by lessons learned, including those from capacity-building activities under the Convention, and should be an effective, iterative process that is participatory, cross-cutting and gender-responsive.

However, the Paris Agreement did not explicitly recognise human mobility as a global challenge requiring institutional capacity at national, regional and local levels. Indeed, the agreement comes up short in acknowledging that those facing extreme environmental risks have the right to receive preventative assistance to avoid being displaced; the right to get support if they’re forced to flee; and the right to build, live, work and integrate in new communities if they cannot return to their homes.

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Needless to say that neither the legal status of refugees, nor the mandate for their protection and assistance were recognised by the Paris Agreement.

Furthermore, the Paris Agreement lacks the urgency, depth and coordinated framework necessary for addressing the immense challenges of climate-induced migration and calls only for a task force to “develop recommendations for integrated approaches to avert, minimise and address displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change.” As we have seen in the previous section, environmental risks and climate change are both drivers and push factors of migration, and are influenced by economic, social, political and demographic aspects. All these different dimensions define a community and an individual’s resilience and vulnerability. Mobility strategies of migrants are not inherently “positive” or “negative”: Mobility can save lives, enhance resilience and reduce risk but adversely amplify vulnerability and expose the displaced to increased and unexpected risks.

A people-centred approach is highly needed for migration in the context of climate change in order to bring a human dimension to the climate change debate. More emphasis needs to be placed on the migrants themselves, their families and communities, and attention should be paid to the challenges they face, and the mobility options that are available to them. In some contexts, migration can constitute an important and positive adaptation strategy that should be supported by policy action and recognised as such in the National Adaptation Plans. The role of migration as an adaptation strategy to climate change can be facilitated through the contributions of migrants and diasporas to remittances, knowledge transfers and investments can serve adaptation purposes.

Following major advances in Cancun in 2010 (decision 1/CP.16, ¶ II/14/f) and in Doha in 2012 (decision 3/CP.18, ¶ 7/a/vi), negotiators under the UNFCCC were in the obligation to make progress on the question of human mobility in relation to climate change. Common policy responses should be decided at local, national, regional and international levels to address the complex nexus of migration, environment and climate change. Indeed, the task force charged with identifying legal, policy and institutional challenges, good practices and lessons learned in developing its recommendations on “integrated approaches to avert, minimise and address displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change” to the Katowice COP24 (2018) on climate-induced migrations including cross-border movements will benefit from the key findings of the Nanseen Initiative. It will hopefully make further progress on the protection agenda at regional level in reference to the New York Declaration and the global compacts on migration and refugees by providing guidance for the integration of the gender approach under the Nationally Determined Contributions especially in connection with climate-induced migration taking stock of the progress already made in mainstreaming gender approach under national climate change policies and climate finance mechanisms.
Climate finance and gender analysis for building local resilience to climate change

The overview of climate finance shows that women benefiting from climate investment have so far been modest, but that numerous opportunities exist to enhance their roles and optimise development co-benefits between gender and climate action (UN WOMEN, 2016). This will require a paradigm shift that puts women and girls at the centre of climate management efforts. This entails going beyond the present categorisation of women as a “vulnerable group” and recognising contributions of women as agents of change. Similarly, it means that the focus on gender mainstreaming must go beyond its traditional safeguard remits and rather aim to shape the overall theory of change underlying climate initiatives.

In 2009, in collaboration with the Heinrich Böll Foundation North America, the “Gender Action” Foundation took a preliminary look at the linkages between climate change, gender justice and the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and published a paper on “Doubling the Damage: World Bank Climate Investment Funds Undermine Climate and Gender Justice” which provided a special focus on the shortcomings of the World Bank Climate Investment Funds (CIFs) in terms of climate and gender justice.

Arguing that “there will be no climate justice without gender justice”, the paper depicted the stark divergence between what is declared, and the reality as follows: The World Bank administering Climate Investment Funds runs a grave risk of exacerbating climate change; Climate change uniquely disproportionately affects poor women; and gender justice will suffer under the CIFs. Ultimately, the paper concludes that the CIFs belie both of the Bank’s new brands about climate and gender, and worse, they will significantly set back related goals.

According to WBG Gender Strategy 2016-2023, bringing a gender lens to climate resilience and developing gender smart solutions to climate change will involve both analytic work and operations through the Climate Investment Funds (CIFs) and gender-smart sustainable forest management through the Forest Investment Program (FIP) of the CIFs and the PROFOR programme. With regard to operations, the CIFs will also focus on enhancing women economic assets and their role in community adaptation, notably in Africa in addition to expanding women employment and entrepreneurship in renewable energy value chains and off grid renewable energy. The document recognised that males and females are not homogenous groups but can be stratified by race, ethnicity, disability, sexual orientation and gender identity which together with income, geographic location and migratory status can lead to multiple overlapping layers of vulnerability and discrimination.

In fact, co-benefits between gender equality and climate action; the gender dimensions of climate finance concepts, sources and instruments; and mainstreaming methodologies and tools to incorporate gender in climate change projects are all key for gender responsive climate financing; Women are also powerful change agents to address climate change at scale. They are key actors in building community resilience and responding to climate related disasters. Gender analysis is needed for gender
responsive climate financing to impose gender equality as a guiding principle for the design, the implementation of climate action and the evaluation of climate change projects and programmes.

However, mainstreaming climate change into the national planning system, which in turn requires incorporating gender considerations into policies and programmes, is prerequisite for gender responsive climate financing mechanisms. Coherence with national development plans, and consistency with National Determined Contributions integrating mitigation and adaptation strategies that need to be developed through gender sensitive participatory and transparent multi-stakeholder’s processes are also key for gender mainstreaming in climate finance.

In fact, migration concerns are overlooked from this scope of the gender analysis approach and methodologies within the Green Climate Fund, while Multilateral Development Banks paid a special attention to human displacements, especially under the environmental and social safeguards but do not systematically integrate migration preoccupations into the gender analysis. GCF projects benefiting countries of origin covered by this first investigation need to be scrutinised in order to see in depth how migration concerns were particularly of guidance for gender analysis. The Nile Delta Project proposed for climate finance by Egypt to the Green Climate Fund has already provided a first approach for gender mainstreaming to tackle the rural-urban climate change induced displacements in the Nile Delta. The effectiveness of the Green Climate Fund in implementing gender inclusive climate finance projects and programmes that integrate the human migration flows should be of importance for future investigation on the integration of climate-induced migration into the national planning systems in countries of origin, transit and destination.

**Conclusion**

Although women and girls are considered as a vulnerable group regarding the discrimination they are facing because of their unequal social and economic status and limited access to natural resources, inheritance, information, technology and finance, additional opportunities for adaptation and resilience make them a true agent of change in their countries of origin. The lack of tailored sustainable development policies that ensure population rootedness in their local areas to prevent climate-induced migrations and the shortcomings of the humanitarian approach in tackling the turmoil caused by climate variability and vulnerability result indeed in massive forcibly migrant flows to Europe through the different Mediterranean routes. The borders security approaches were not successful in discouraging irregular migrants to reach out countries of destination and the alternative should be strengthening human security and local development approaches including in rural areas in countries of origin.

The nexus conflicts-climate change-migration in countries of origin should be especially emphasised and further investigations on conflicts over natural resources between local communities as exacerbated by climate change are required to rethink an alternative pathway for resilience, climate security and peaceful societies in sub-Saharan countries, the great Horn of Africa, in southern and eastern Mediterranean
countries. The population dynamics that entail the movement of the Internally Displaced Persons and international migrants reveal a knowledge gap on how internally displaced persons in the absence of a return or a resettlement scheme could migrate across borders. Also, the data gap on climate-induced migration and its gendered dimensions should be closed. Evidence-based analysis are also needed to feed into the migration profiles of countries of origin and to be of guidance for the national planning systems and for regional processes intended to formulate migration policies, especially in the Mediterranean.

This contribution attempted to identify the legal, policy and lessons learned on climate-induced migration to, across and within the Mediterranean region. The key findings of this analysis shed light on the way forward for advocacy on a Regional Protection Agenda of climate migrants to the Katowice COP 24 at the end of 2018. However, insightful proposals about the institutions that are to defend a preventive approach of climate-induced migration by providing more tailored responses to climate change, targeting the rural space in countries of origin are needed to enhance their resilience to disasters through peace building processes that can face climate vulnerability, mitigate the impacts of conflicts over natural resources and prevent protracted conflicts. Gender-inclusive climate change responses must necessarily involve countries of origin of climate migrants to the Mediterranean region in the Disaster Displacement Platform. A regional protection agenda reflecting the gendered dimensions of climate-induced migration could translate the regional reading of the Compact on Migration and Refugees into some aspiring and inspiring goals and targets for further achievements on the goal 5 of the 2030 Agenda, and climate finance projects and programmes shall contribute to the preventive approach of adaptation to climate change under rural development strategies of the countries of origin. A regional reading of the goal 5 of the 2030 Agenda that encompasses the gendered dimensions of climate change is highly needed to develop the Mediterranean recommendations on climate-induced migrations including cross-border movements to the Katowice COP 24 (2018).

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